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This paper ﬁ   rst presents a comprehensive 
analysis of the signiﬁ   cance of different 
transmission channels of the global economic 
and  ﬁ   nancial crisis to Sub-Saharan African 
countries. It then examines the repercussions 
of the crisis for the growth of gross domestic 
product (GDP) and its components; this is 
complemented by a study of the responses of 
monetary and ﬁ  scal authorities to the challenges 
posed by the crisis, both in regional terms and 
on the basis of selected country case studies. 
Finally, the paper highlights medium-term to 
long-term challenges for ensuring a sustainable 
recovery and for fostering resilience against 
potential future shocks.
The authors ﬁ   nd that the intensity of the 
impact of the crisis varies widely across 
countries, with a lack of export diversiﬁ  cation 
apparently having been particularly conducive 
to its transmission. However, the analysis 
of the magnitude of the observed swings in 
macroeconomic variables also reveals that 
although they were large, they were not 
exceptional and are comparable to ﬂ  uctuations 
Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed in the recent 
past. Furthermore, in a non-negligible number 
of instances the extent of the slowdown seems 
to have been determined by domestic factors 
as well. Particularly, policies and conditions 
prior to the global recession, rather than crisis 
contagion  per se, appear decisively to have 
shaped the scope of possible responses in many 
cases.
As a result, many of the policy lessons Sub-
Saharan Africa might draw from the crisis 
do not involve radical deviation from the 
policies in place before. Efforts to improve the 
management of resource revenue for commodity-
dependent countries, necessary reforms of the 
economic and business environment to enable 
a diversiﬁ  cation of the export base, and further 
regional integration might help to alleviate 
possible future external shocks. Additionally, 
the crisis re-emphasises the need to back growth 
prospects by redeﬁ   ning sectoral priorities, 
for example by concentrating on infrastructure 
and agricultural supply. Lastly, new challenges 
in the wake of the crisis may call for a re-
focusing of policy initiatives, e.g. to address 
an emergence of potential ﬁ  nancing constraints 
for aid-dependent economies or the exposure of 
domestic ﬁ  nancial sectors to systemic shocks. 
JEL code: R11, E60, F30, O10
Keywords: regional growth, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
balance of payments, global economic crisis, 
international spillovers.6
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since the start of the new millennium, the 
integration of Sub-Saharan Africa into the world 
economy has increased considerably, driven by 
substantial surges in demand and prices for its 
main export commodities which coincided with 
an extended period of enhanced macroeconomic 
and political stability in many countries. While 
this process has to a large extent been driven by 
emerging economic powers such as China or 
India, the region’s largest trading partner has 
remained the EU, which accounts for about a 
quarter of its merchandise trade, although its 
role is declining. However, less than ﬁ  ve percent 
of goods traded between the EU and non-EU 
countries originated in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Nevertheless, for individual EU Member States, 
particularly for those with former colonial ties, 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in their trade with 
countries outside the EU ranges from about 
ﬁ  ve percent in Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, to seven percent in France, 
eight percent in Spain and almost 21 percent in 
Portugal.1
Imports of primary goods,2 particularly energy-
related products, accounted for around two 
thirds of total EU trade with Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2008, with South Africa (33%), Nigeria 
(23%) and Angola (11%) constituting the most 
important counterparts. Thus, despite only 
ﬁ  ve percent of the EU’s oil imports currently 
being sourced from Sub-Saharan Africa,3 
and Nigeria, the largest exporter of gas to 
the EU from the region, having a mere 5.1% 
market share,4 economic and political events 
on the continent are of more than negligible 
importance for the EU and the euro area. Both 
energy security and development assistance 
are issues of long-term relevance, for example 
to achieve a diversiﬁ   ed supply of oil and 
gas or alleviate migration ﬂ   ows by ensuring 
sustained development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Additionally, more immediate incidents may 
also have repercussions for macroeconomic 
developments in the EU. The unrest in Nigeria’s 
Niger delta in 2008, for example, put additional 
pressure on oil prices at a time when supply 
concerns were a feature of many commodity 
markets. In acknowledgement of these trends, 
since the start of the new millennium the 
EU has ramped up its efforts to engage with 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as have other advanced and 
emerging economies. This is evidenced by the 
adoption of an EU Strategy for Africa  5 in 2005, 
the signature of an Africa EU partnership on 
energy  6 at the EU-Africa summit in 2007 
and the ongoing negotiation of Economic 
Partnership Agreements with African states. 
Furthermore, for Sub-Saharan African countries, 
the experience of the EU and the euro area with 
progressively closer economic and monetary 
integration frequently serves as a blue print for 
similar regional integration schemes in Africa.
The increasing integration of long-neglected 
Sub-Saharan Africa into the world economy 
may also make the countries of the region 
more vulnerable to spillover effects from the 
“Great Recession”. Against this background, 
the paper ﬁ  rst presents a comprehensive analysis 
of the transmission channels of the crisis to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, examining the relevance of 
different transmission channels for the continent, 
such as trade, aid, migrant transfers and foreign 
direct investment, and gauging their signiﬁ  cance 
on a country-by-country basis. After a brief 
overview of the impact of the crisis on some 
key macroeconomic variables, the study turns to 
its repercussions for the growth of GDP and its 
components in individual countries. The paper 
then explores the response of monetary and ﬁ  scal 
authorities to the challenges posed by the crisis, 
both in regional terms as well as on the basis of 
selected country case studies. Lastly, the study 
The large share of Portugal’s trade with Sub-Saharan Africa is  1 
mainly the result of a brisk expansion of its trade relations with 
Angola and Nigeria since the early 2000s. Between 2000 and 
2008, imports from Nigeria tripled to USD 2.5 billion, while 
exports to Angola (USD 3.3 billion) rose ten fold and imports 
(USD 0.6 billion) twelve fold during the same period.
The classiﬁ  cation of primary goods follows Lall (2000). 2 
See Youngs (2009), p. 5. 3 
See Commission of the European Communities (2010), p. 31. 4 
See Commission of the European Communities (2005). 5 
See Council of the European Union (2007). 6 7
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1   INTRODUCTION
presents a short-term outlook for Sub-Saharan 
Africa, before emphasising medium-term to 
long-term challenges that need to be addressed 
in order to ensure sustainable recovery and 
foster the continent’s resilience against potential 
future crises.8
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2  THE TRANSMISSION CHANNELS 
OF THE CRISIS 
While the repercussions of the global ﬁ  nancial 
and economic crisis were undeniably felt on 
a considerable scale in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the impact appears to have been distinctively 
different from that experienced by advanced and 
many other emerging and developing countries 
and regions. Indeed, the ﬁ  rst wave of the crisis, 
characterised by the rapid spread of ﬁ  nancial 
turmoil in the United States to other developed 
economies and some emerging markets via their 
closely interconnected ﬁ   nancial systems, left 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with the exception of South 
Africa, comparatively unscathed. This was 
due to the very weak cross-border integration 
of the region’s often poorly developed 
ﬁ   nancial markets, the fact that its banking 
sectors had virtually no exposure to assets 
immediately affected by the fallout, and the only 
limited dependency of its private and public 
sectors on obtaining ﬁ  nancial-market-based 
funding abroad. 
However, the second wave of the turmoil, when 
the disorder in the ﬁ  nancial sector began to have 
an impact on the real economy, had profound 
consequences for the continent,7 which since the 
start of the new millennium has become 
increasingly integrated into the world economy 
(see Chart 1). A large part of this closer 
integration resulted from a signiﬁ  cant increase 
in the demand for commodities and in their 
prices, which started in the late 1990s, and an 
extended period of enhanced macroeconomic 
and political stability in many countries, making 
them viable business partners, often for the 
ﬁ  rst time.
For an overview, see also Chauvin and Lantéri (2009). 7 
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1) Excluding the capital account balance and net other investment which were subject to signiﬁ  cant distortions due to debt restructuring 
and debt cancellation operations.9
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2   THE TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS OF 
THE CRISIS
Against this background, the main channels 
through which the global recession affected 
Sub-Saharan Africa are likely to have been 
those that have always been important to the 
continent, namely trade and aid, as well as 
those that have increasingly become so in 
recent years, such as migrant transfers or 
foreign direct investment.8
The next three sections thus attempt to assess the 
transmission of the global economic slowdown 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, differentiating between 
its impact on exports and on capital ﬂ  ows. They 
do so on a country-by-country basis, thereby 
avoiding grouping countries before any analysis 
is conducted (for example by income level or 
resource endowment), and so following an 
approach different from that which is frequently 
used when studying the continent.9 This should 
ensure that similarities among economies with 
regard to the consequences they experienced 
from the crisis, which may potentially be 
due to similar country characteristics, are 
not blurred by any predetermined country 
classiﬁ  cations. In order to ensure comparability 
across countries, the IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook database is used for the analysis; 
this provides sufﬁ   cient information for 42 
of the 48 economies under consideration.10
2.1  THE RELEVANCE OF DIFFERENT 
TRANSMISSION CHANNELS
Before assessing the impact the crisis may 
have had on Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade and 
capital  ﬂ   ows, it seems warranted to consider 
the importance of those ﬂ  ows for the continent 
from the perspective of individual countries. 
Indeed, classifying economies according to the 
share of different balance of payments items in 
terms of their respective GDPs reveals a rather 
heterogeneous picture (see Table 1).11
Exports of goods contributed signiﬁ  cantly  to 
the GDP of Sub-Saharan African economies, 
with their share remaining below 10% in only 
eight cases. The major oil producers and small 
land-locked Lesotho and Swaziland in particular 
rank among those countries where merchandise 
exports account for the largest share of GDP. 
Conversely, exports of services, apart from a 
few exceptions,12 play a relatively minor role 
in the vast majority of Sub-Saharan African 
countries.
A comparison of net foreign direct investment 
with net portfolio investment ﬂ  ows  yields 
similar results.13 While the latter are of at best 
marginal signiﬁ  cance for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the former are one of the key sources of external 
ﬁ  nancing for the region, with oil- and mineral 
exporters generally the main beneﬁ  ciaries.
Over the last decade, net other investment ﬂ  ows and transactions  8 
recorded in capital accounts were inﬂ  uenced to a considerable 
extent by international efforts to alleviate Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
sizeable debt burden. Countries whose debt was cancelled 
recorded positive capital account balances which were offset 
by correspondingly negative net other investment ﬂ  ows, 
representing the erasing of the respective debt stocks. Because 
they are mere accounting identities and difﬁ  cult to disentangle 
from any “real” ﬂ  ows owing to their often disparate accounting 
treatment, net other investment and the capital account balances 
are not considered in this paper.
See for example Dorsey et al. (2008) or various editions of the  9 
IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.
The data supplied by the World Economic Outlook database for  10 
Eritrea, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sudan and 
Zimbabwe are not sufﬁ  cient for the analysis conducted in this 
paper.
The classiﬁ  cation in Table 1 takes into consideration the average  11 
share of the respective balance of payments item over GDP for the 
period 2000 to 2009. This timeframe was chosen as it coincides 
with a range of structural changes directly affecting Sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as a prolonged rise in demand and prices for the 
region’s main export commodities, the ascent of China and 
some other emerging economies as major trading partners of and 
investors in Africa, efforts to restructure and cancel a substantial 
part of the continent’s debt, and non-negligible improvements in 
the business climate and the governance structure of a number 
of countries.
Services represent a noteworthy share of GDP in the Seychelles  12 
(43.7%), Djibouti (32.0%), Cape Verde (29.2%), Mauritius 
(25.3%) and the Gambia (19.8%) only, reﬂ  ecting  their 
comparatively high dependency on tourism or their role as trade 
hubs.
This study considers exports as gross ﬂ  ows while all capital ﬂ  ows  13 
are measured net, since the World Economic Outlook database 
does not offer a breakdown into gross amounts for all non-trade 
related items in the balance of payments. As an example, private 
and ofﬁ  cial current transfers are not obtainable on a gross basis. 
Nevertheless, as most Sub-Saharan African countries are more 
likely to be recipients of capital than its source, it is probable 
that net ﬂ  ows are a reasonable approximation for corresponding 
gross (in)ﬂ  ows in many instances. Net income ﬂ  ows which are 
persistently negative for almost all countries seem to be the only 
exception to this pattern (see also Chart 1, Panel B).10
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As well as foreign direct investment, aid and 
workers’ remittances  14 are similarly vital to 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with their share of GDP 
surpassing 10% in six and four countries 
respectively. Cape Verde, the Comoros, Nigeria 
and Ghana are the main recipients of migrant 
transfers, recording average annual net ﬂ  ows of 
17.3%, 15.6%, 12.3% and 12.2% of GDP 
respectively between 2000 and 2009, whereas in 
most of the remaining economies, which are 
rich in oil and mineral resources, remittances 
represent a much smaller share of GDP. Some 
oil producing countries, such as the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea or Gabon, even displayed 
negative net ﬂ  ows over that period. Likewise, 
oil and mineral producers, with their 
comparatively elevated income levels, are not 
the primary targets of aid. Rather, these funds 
are directed at poorer countries (Ethiopia, 
Malawi) and those emerging or having emerged 
from political crises (the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone). 
Additionally, some of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
smallest countries have received the highest aid 
in relation to their GDP, with ratios of 26.5% 
(Lesotho), 17.4% (Burundi), 13.0% (Swaziland), 
and 10.6% (Rwanda).
Lastly, net factor income, which encompasses 
the remuneration of employees working but not 
living abroad, as well as any income received 
from or paid on foreign direct, portfolio and 
other investment, is a sizeable component 
of the balance of payments in a wide range 
of Sub-Saharan African countries, and is 
predominantly negative. As a share of GDP, 
oil producing countries show the largest outﬂ  ows 
of this type, at 42.4% (Equatorial Guinea), 
29.9% (the Congo), 14.7% (Angola), 13.4% 
(Gabon), 13.8% (Chad), and 7.7% (Nigeria). 
In fact, Benin (2.1%), Djibouti (7.8%), and 
Lesotho (27.0%) are the only economies in the 
region displaying a steadily positive ﬂ  ow of net 
factor income at a signiﬁ   cant level, possibly 
because some of their populations commute to 
work in third countries.
As the analysis above shows, exports of 
services and portfolio investment ﬂ  ows  play 
The World Economic Outlook database does not give aid and  14 
workers’ remittances as separate items, but reports net current 
transfers from private and ofﬁ  cial sources respectively. While 
these categories are slightly broader, in the case of Africa they 
are likely to provide a reasonable approximation of aid and 
remittances ﬂ  ows.
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Trade ﬂ  ows (gross)
Exports of goods 9 10 15 8
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Capital ﬂ  ows (net)
Current account
Net factor income 6 9 15 12
Net current transfers (private) 4 6 19 13
Net current transfers (ofﬁ  cial) 6 7 18 11
Financial account
Net foreign direct investment 5 8 26 3
Net portfolio investment 1 0 8 33
Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Countries are classiﬁ  ed into the four groups according to the absolute value of the respective item’s average annual share in a 
country’s GDP between 2000 and 2009.11
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2   THE TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS OF 
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only a marginal role in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and are therefore unlikely to have acted as an 
important channel of transmission for the crisis. 
There is thus no more detailed analysis of these 
balance of payments items in the following 
sections. Additionally, countries where the 
share of merchandise exports is below 10% of 
GDP or where net factor income, net current 
transfers or net FDI as a proportion of GDP 
does not exceed 1% are unlikely to have been 
substantially affected by ﬂ  uctuations in any of 
these balance of payments ﬂ  ows. Nevertheless, 
even though the application of this methodology 
entails an ex ante reduction in the number of 
countries, it does not preclude the consideration 
of individual (out-of-sample) cases should this 
appear warranted.
2.2  TRANSMISSION VIA MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
Although the ﬁ   rst signs of the impending 
global  ﬁ   nancial market turmoil were already 
felt in the summer of 2007, raw material prices 
initially continued to rise until the summer 
of 2008, primarily driven by the presumed 
ability of emerging and developing countries 
to “decouple” from a progressively worsening 
outlook for advanced economies and the 
supposed diversiﬁ  cation beneﬁ  ts of commodities 
as a separate asset class. However, after the 
scale of the downturn became increasingly 
evident and with the intensiﬁ  cation of the crisis 
in September 2008, commodity prices fell 
precipitously until the end of 2008. A rebound 
since then notwithstanding, by the end of 2009 
price levels remained considerably below the 
peaks witnessed in 2008 (see Chart 2).
Thus, in sharp contrast to the global commodity 
price shock experienced in 2008, which had 
immediate major implications for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s net food and energy importers, many 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa felt little 
effect from the ﬁ   nancial crisis at the start, 
its repercussions on their exports of goods 
only manifesting themselves when commodity 
prices started to drop. Consequently, in 2008 the 
ratio of merchandise exports as a share of GDP 
declined to below its multi-year (2000-2007) 
average in only 13 of those 34 Sub-Saharan 
African countries for which such exports 
constitute an important component (i.e. more 
than 10%) of GDP, and signiﬁ  cantly so in just 
seven cases (see Chart 3). In 2009, however, 
these ﬁ  gures increased to 23 and 13 respectively, 
which suggests a deteriorating situation in a 
sizeable number of countries, irrespective of the 
proportion of their GDP exports represent.
Among those economies gravely affected, most 
major oil producers feature prominently, as well 
as Botswana, which derives a large part of its 
export revenues from the sale of diamonds. 
Furthermore, textile manufacturers (Lesotho, 
Madagascar and Mauritius) seem to have been 
hit hard by the crisis. Being located near South 
Africa also appears to have been detrimental for 
some countries, particularly South African 
Customs Union (SACU) members Botswana, 
Lesotho, and Swaziland, which are closely 
integrated with South Africa and have therefore 
suffered from the slowdown of its economy.15
For a complete overview of countries which were subject to a  15 
(signiﬁ  cant) drop in their merchandise exports as a share of GDP 
in 2008 and 2009, see Annex A.
Chart 2 Commodity price developments
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Sources: IMF and own calculations.12
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Interestingly, however, not all economies 
recorded a fall in the share of merchandise 
exports in their GDP, with a non-negligible 
number (21 in 2008 and 11 in 2009) actually 
showing rises, indicating that the impact of 
the global contraction in trade volumes across 
Sub-Saharan Africa was somewhat selective. 
This  ﬁ   nding is also conﬁ   rmed if changes in 
export values are broken down into price and 
volume effects: seven countries actually saw a 
rise in their export volumes in both 2008 and 
2009, among them the Congo, Gabon, Namibia, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Moreover, the export 
volumes of 20 economies were higher at the end 
of 2009, after the crisis had fully unfolded, than 
at the end of 2007.
Such a differentiation also reveals that the 
massive  ﬂ   uctuations in Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
export prices witnessed in 2008 and 2009 were 
the main driver of corresponding changes in 
export values in many instances (see Chart 4). 
As a result, the primary repercussion of the crisis 
for the merchandise exports of Sub-Saharan 
Africa was frequently not so much a reduction 
in export volumes but rather a contribution 
to the collapse of the very high raw material 
price levels observed in the summer of 2008. 
Accordingly, the impact of the crisis on the 
economic growth of a wide range of countries 































(2) (see note below)
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(1)
Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: The chart shows the total number of countries (1) in the 
respective category and those displaying a negative change of 
more (2) or less (3) than one standard deviation in merchandise 
exports as a share of GDP in 2008 and 2009 in comparison to the 
2000-2007 average.
Chart 4 Development of values, volumes 
and prices of merchandise exports
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2   THE TRANSMISSION 
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can be expected to be of a more indirect nature, 
namely via subdued commodity revenues 
depressing domestic demand, rather than via 
the direct link of export to GDP growth (see also 
Section 4.2 for a more in-depth analysis).
2.3  TRANSMISSION VIA CAPITAL FLOWS
Besides its effects on trade, the crisis 
also resulted in considerable disruptions of 
cross-border capital ﬂ   ows. A reduction in 
proﬁ  table investment opportunities owing to a 
deteriorating economic outlook, coupled with 
less availability and increased costs of ﬁ  nancing 
and a rise in perceived risk premia, signiﬁ  cantly 
reduced cross-border investment. Workers’ 
remittances and aid ﬂ  ows developed negatively 
as a result of worsening labour market conditions 
in advanced economies, which were the ﬁ  rst to 
be hit by the crisis and where the overwhelming 
majority of migrants reside, and as a result of 
constrained government budgets in the face of 
substantial domestic policy challenges. Lastly, 
ﬂ  ows of factor income, whether derived from 
the provision of labour or capital, were adversely 
affected too.
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, capital ﬂ  ows 
decreased in a range of countries, even though 
the scope and size of this development was 
probably less dramatic than initially estimated 
(see Chart 5). In fact, many economies recorded 
net  ﬂ  ows of capital in 2008 and 2009 above 
their annual 2000-2007 average, which may 
suggest a continuing commitment on the part of 
foreign counterparts. Even for those economies 
registering a drop, the change was often not 
considerably different from similar ﬂ  uctuations 
experienced in the recent past, implying that the 
impact of the crisis was in many instances rather 
subdued.
The contraction in net foreign direct investment 
ﬂ   ows across Sub-Saharan Africa was 
comparatively mild. By 2009, less than half of 
all economies had registered a fall to below their 
respective 2000-2007 averages and in only 
six countries was the decline in excess of 
one standard deviation (see Chart 5, Panel A; 
Chart 6). Net foreign direct investment as a 
share of GDP contracted most tangibly in some 
oil (Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria) and 
mineral producing countries (Mauritania, 
Zambia),16 with Tanzania and Togo also 
witnessing substantial drops (see Chart 6).
Turning to net current transfers of a private 
origin (see Chart 5, Panel C), which are 
primarily determined by remittances of 
migrants, substantial decreases are notable in 
three (Cape Verde, Ghana and Nigeria) of the 
four countries where such transfers account for 
more than 10% of GDP, while the groups where 
they are less prominent appear to be affected to 
a smaller degree, with only Benin seeing a ratio 
of these transfers to GDP in 2009 of more than 
one standard deviation below its 2000-2007 
average. This relatively benign picture of a 
rather subdued fall in this type of capital ﬂ  ow to 
Sub-Saharan Africa is also corroborated 
by World Bank estimates of the volume of 
remittances destined for developing countries. 
While their overall volume is expected to 
have declined by 6.0% in 2009, the fall in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to be limited to 
2.7%, among the lowest of the regions surveyed 
by the World Bank.17 
Aid, which makes up net current transfers of an 
ofﬁ   cial nature, had registered a sizeable 
reduction in a few countries by 2009, mainly in 
those less reliant on ofﬁ  cial assistance such as 
Chad, Djibouti, Madagascar, Mauritania, and 
Senegal (see Chart 5, Panel D and Annex B), 
whereas there seemed to be virtually no 
noticeable impact on economies which are 
highly dependent on this type of ﬁ  nance. Thus, 
some isolated cases of tangible aid cuts 
notwithstanding, the pattern of aid provision to 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008 and 2009 as 
compared to annual average (net) ﬂ  ows between 
2000 and 2007 does not seem to support the 
In the same group, Angola and Botswana were also negatively  16 
affected but with the fall limited to less than one standard deviation 
around their respective 2000-2007 averages. For a complete 
overview of countries which experienced a (signiﬁ  cant) drop in 
their net foreign direct investment (and other capital ﬂ  ows) as a 
share of GDP in 2008 and 2009, see Annex B.
See World Bank (2010), p. 18. 17 14
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notion of a broad retrenchment on the part of 
ofﬁ   cial donors to the continent. However, 
despite there still being no evidence of a 
widespread curtailment of aid, the evolution of 
ofﬁ   cial development assistance (ODA) from 
Scandinavian countries in the wake of their 
banking crises in the early 1990s proves 
instructive (see Table 2). In that instance, aid 
budgets were indeed reduced substantially, with 
ODA from Finland and Sweden shrinking by a 
respective 58 and 20 percent between 1991 and 
1995. Thus, trends in aid ﬂ  ows  towards 
Sub-Saharan Africa bear watching, particularly 
in the light of constrained public ﬁ  nances  in 
many donor nations.18 
See also Dabla-Norris et al. (2010) and Roodman (2008). 18 
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Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: The charts show the total number of countries (1) in the respective category and those displaying a negative change of more 
(2) or less (3) than one standard deviation in the respective net capital ﬂ  ow as a share of GDP in 2008 and 2009 in comparison to the 
2000-2007 average.15
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2   THE TRANSMISSION 
CHANNELS OF 
THE CRISIS
Finally, and broadly in line with developments 
observed for the other capital ﬂ  ows, net factor 
income had not materially declined by the end 
of 2009. However, given that the vast majority 
of Sub-Saharan African economies are net 
payers of factor income, the fact that these 
outﬂ   ows did not become even larger must 
be interpreted positively, as an indication of 
diminished pressure on their current account 
positions from this perspective. Among the 
Chart 6 Net foreign direct investment
































































Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Blue dashed lines indicate one standard deviation around each country’s 2000-2007 average.
Table 2 ODA flows from Scandinavian countries
(USD billions)
(1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995)
Finland
All recipients 0.9 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.4
of which:
Developing countries 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Sweden
All recipients 2.1 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.7
of which:
Developing countries 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.2
Source: OECD.16
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only noteworthy net recipients of factor income 
in the region, Djibouti and Lesotho continued 
to receive this form of income at close to 
pre-crisis levels, whereas Swaziland recorded 
a fall of more than one standard deviation from 
the 2000-2007 average in its net factor income 
to GDP ratio.
If developments in capital ﬂ  ows to Sub-Saharan 
Africa since the onset of the crisis in 2007 are 
considered, it becomes evident that while some 
effects are visible they are more observable 
in certain countries than on a continent-wide 
scale. Moreover, the comparison of capital 
ﬂ  ows in 2008 and 2009 with their 2000-2007 
averages raises the question of whether the in 
some cases massive capital ﬂ  ows Sub-Saharan 
Africa (and other emerging and developing 
regions) had received in the years immediately 
before the crisis would have been sustainable 
over the longer term and whether the levels seen 
in 2008 and 2009 to a certain extent signify a 
“return to normal”, since in many instances 
there have been no substantial deviations from 
the multiyear averages so far. Nevertheless, 
the fact that the crisis has not had a widespread 
impact on capital ﬂ  ows to Sub-Saharan Africa 
to date does not preclude further repercussions 
and effects of a longer-term nature in the 
future; these might include permanently lower 
availability and/or higher costs of ﬁ  nance  or 
increased pressure on aid budgets resulting from 
the need to consolidate government ﬁ  nances in 
some donor nations.17
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Before examining the interaction between the 
transmission channels outlined in section 2 and 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP and its components, 
which is the focus of this paper, this analysis 
should be placed in a wider context with a brief 
review of the development of other important 
macroeconomic variables after the outbreak of 
the crisis in the summer of 2007.
Across the continent, current account and ﬁ  scal 
balances worsened by sometimes considerable 
margins between 2007 and 2009 in the vast 
majority of countries (see Chart 7).19 The 
deterioration was especially pronounced on the 
left-hand side of the distribution where surpluses 
had previously been particularly high, with 
substantial convergence to region-wide averages 
by the end of 2009. At the centre of the 
distribution, current account balances 
(see Chart 7, Panel A) declined mainly in 2008, 
whereas there was a slight improvement in 
2009, possibly related to opposing terms of 
trade shocks experienced by many economies 
during these two years.20 By contrast, budget 
balances registered comparatively slight drops 
in 2008, with the main weakening taking place 
in 2009 (see Chart 7, Panel B).
Inﬂ  ation rates also reﬂ  ected ﬂ  uctuations of raw 
material prices to a signiﬁ   cant extent. Since 
food and, to a lesser degree, energy represent 
the major items in the consumption baskets 
of many Sub-Saharan African countries, 
the commodity price shock of 2008 was in 
many instances rapidly transmitted to domestic 
prices, as evidenced by a pronounced upward 
It is important to note that the charts presented in this section only  19 
allow conclusions to be drawn about shifts in the distribution 
of the respective indicator across Sub-Saharan Africa as a 
whole, as the applied ranking of the variables from highest to 
lowest outcome might result in a different order of countries for 
each year.
Indeed, many producers of agricultural commodities witnessed  20 
a substantial worsening of their terms of trade in 2008, as price 
increases affecting the value of their energy imports far outpaced 
corresponding price rises for their main exports. To a certain 
extent, the precipitous fall in commodity prices after the summer 
of 2008 had the opposite effect, and this partly explains current 
account ﬂ  uctuations in 2009.
Chart 7 Distribution of changes in current account and budget balances across Sub-Saharan 
Africa













































Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Indicators are ranked from highest to lowest country observations along the x-axis, giving an indication of the distribution of the 
respective variable across Sub-Saharan Africa in each year.18
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shift of inﬂ   ation rates across Sub-Saharan 
Africa in 2008 (see Chart 8). In 2009, inﬂ  ation 
subsided somewhat, although the overall level 
was still higher than in 2007, possibly owing to 
pass-through effects from the large exchange 
rate depreciations witnessed in some countries in 
the wake of the crisis and the renewed upswing 
in raw material prices observed in the course 
of 2009. 
However, most countries operating a pegged or 
closely managed exchange rate regime managed 
to maintain these frameworks during the 
turbulence (see Chart 9, Panel A).21 Nevertheless, 
in some instances this stability came at the 
expense of considerable losses of foreign 
exchange reserves (see Chart 9, Panel B). 
Consequently, depleted stocks of central banks’ 
foreign currency holdings had to be replenished 
by bilateral or multilateral ﬁ  nancing  support 
(see also section 5.2.2 and Annex D), and this 
ultimately raised reserves to more comfortable 
levels in 2009.
Chart 9, Panel A shows exchange rate developments of  21 
Sub-Saharan African currencies against their respective 
anchor currencies. Where the anchor currencies are not clearly 
discernible or there is no anchor currency, the exchange rate 
against the US dollar is shown. For an overview of monetary and 
exchange rate frameworks in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Annex C.






















Sources: IMF and own calculations. 
Note: Inﬂ  ation rates are ranked from highest to lowest country 
observations along the x-axis, giving an indication of the 
distribution of inﬂ  ation across Sub-Saharan Africa in each year.
Chart 9 Distribution of changes in exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves across 
Sub-Saharan Africa





































Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Indicators are ranked from highest to lowest country observations along the x-axis, giving an indication of the distribution of the 
respective variable across Sub-Saharan Africa in each year.19
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AND ITS COMPONENTS
While the relationship between real GDP 
growth and export volumes is relatively 
straightforward, the link between real GDP 
growth and ﬂ  uctuations in export prices and 
capital ﬂ  ows is of a more indirect and subtle 
nature. Even though a fall in Sub-Saharan 
African raw material producers’ export prices 
is per se a negative event, as it might weigh 
on spending and investment opportunities of 
the government and the private sector, a non-
negligible number of countries on the continent 
are importers of the same commodities that 
others are selling, with oil and its derivatives 
being the most notable example. For these 
economies, a fall in the prices of primary 
goods is actually beneﬁ   cial, as it augments 
the spending possibilities of households, 
corporations and the public sector, and this 
ultimately makes a positive contribution to 
GDP growth.
A contraction in inﬂ   ows of foreign direct 
investment may reduce the pace of capital 
accumulation in an economy. This effect is 
likely to feature most prominently where 
domestic saving rates are low, ultimately 
adversely affecting long-term potential GDP 
growth. A retrenchment in migrant transfers 
could have a similar impact, to the extent that 
such transfers are channelled to productive 
investment opportunities, but is more likely 
to depress private consumption. The primary 
ramiﬁ   cations of diminished aid ﬂ  ows  are 
likely to be constrained government budgets, 
which in turn reduces the public sector’s 
margin for manoeuvre in pursuing investment 
projects or ﬁ  nancing spending, and potentially 
further pressures on private consumption or 
investment when donor support is provided 
without direct government involvement. Lastly, 
in those instances where factor income ﬂ  ows 
are positive, a drop might entail repercussions 
comparable to those of a fall in current transfers 
from private sources, namely a reduction in 
private consumption and investment.
4.1  THE EVOLUTION OF GDP IN SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA
Analysing the development of real GDP 
growth rates in Sub-Saharan Africa for the 
years 2008 and 2009 and contrasting them with 
annual averages over the period 2000 to 2007 
shows that most countries (32) had witnessed 
a slowdown by 2009 (see Chart 10, blue bars). 
Notably, however, a deterioration in economic 
performance of more than one standard 
deviation is observable in only 21 cases (see also 
Chart 12), which suggests that the repercussions 
felt in half of the countries in the sample were 
not considerably different from ﬂ  uctuations 
experienced in the recent past.
Taking a narrower focus and contrasting 
increases in output in 2009 with 2008 levels 
only, 28 countries in the sample showed a 
decline in GDP growth of more than one 
percentage point (see Chart 10, red bars). Of 
those, eight recorded a deceleration of between 
two and ﬁ  ve percentage points, while in nine the 
drop was of more than ﬁ  ve percentage points 
(Angola, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Niger, Rwanda, the Seychelles, 
and South Africa).
Despite this general trend of in some cases 
signiﬁ   cantly lower rates of GDP growth, 
six countries nevertheless recorded a rise 
in economic activity in 2009 (the Comoros, 
the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya, Togo, and 
Zambia). In particular, the Congo was helped 
by an increase in oil production from new ﬁ  elds, 
while Kenya recovered from the political crisis 
in early 2008 that followed its elections in late 
2007. Similarly, Cote d’Ivoire continued to 
recuperate from protracted internal turmoil and 
beneﬁ  ted from improved terms of trade.
The extent to which the downturn can be 
explained by spillover effects from the crisis has 
been investigated by Drummond and Ramirez 
(2009), who show such effects to account for 
about 90% of the projected deceleration in 
growth in 2009 for the continent as whole, 20
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considerable differences between countries 
notwithstanding. In fact, a one percentage point 
decrease in world output is found to reduce 
growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by an estimated 
0.4 to 0.5 percentage points in the following 
two years, with the impact partly being felt at 
the time (0.2 percentage points) and partly in the 
following year (0.2 percentage points). 
Surprisingly and somewhat counter-intuitively, 
Drummond and Ramirez attribute the economic 
slowdown in Angola, Botswana and Equatorial 
Guinea mainly to domestic factors, with only a 
small fraction being accounted for by spillover 
effects. To a certain extent this stands in contrast 
to the results presented in this paper further 
above.22 For another group, including Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Comoros, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal, 
Drummond and Ramirez ﬁ   nd the projected 
decline to be mostly consistent with spillover 
effects from the global contraction and lower 
commodity prices, with these two developments 
potentially being closely linked. Lastly, for the 
remaining countries, the variation in growth is 
generally explained by spillover effects even 
though some domestic factors or shocks, partially 
of an offsetting nature, appear to have been 
relevant too.
If Sub-Saharan Africa is broken down by its 
sub-regions, SACU  23 countries registered the 
sharpest decline in GDP between 2008 and 
2009, followed by CEMAC  24 countries, with 
In contrast to the far simpler approach taken in this study,  22 
Drummond and Ramirez (2009) use a series of dynamic panel 
regressions, relating real growth in domestic output to growth 
in the rest of the world, weighted by exports to the respective 
economy’s trading partners and adjusted for a range of control 
variables, such as oil prices and global ﬁ  nancial  conditions. 
On the basis of these regressions, the authors conduct country-
speciﬁ  c simulations of the effect of changes in commodity prices 
and ﬂ  uctuations in world output on domestic growth.
South African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,  23 
South Africa, Swaziland).
Central African Economic and Monetary Union (Cameroon,  24 
Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon).
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Sources: IMF and own calculations.21
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WAEMU  25 and EAC  26 countries seemingly less 
affected (see Chart 11). For SACU members 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, 
the crisis was transmitted mainly through trade 
channels, coupled with a reduction in output in 
mining (Botswana, Namibia) and textiles 
(Lesotho). Additionally, these countries rely 
heavily on receipts from their customs union 
with South Africa, which account for an average 
of 20% of their GDP and represent a large part 
of their government revenues.27 As South 
Africa’s share in SACU’s revenue pool is high 
on account of the large volume of its imports as 
compared to the other members, the contraction 
in its economic activity and thereby its imports 
considerably reduced the funds available to 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
Among CEMAC countries, Equatorial Guinea 
recorded the most signiﬁ  cant slowdown, with its 
GDP expanding by only 5.3% in 2009, down from 
10.7% in 2008. Region-wide growth similarly 
weakened to 2.3% in 2009, compared to 4.2% in 
2008, reﬂ  ecting the repercussions of the crisis on 
global demand for oil and hence its price. Even 
though the direct impact of ﬂ  uctuations  in 
commodity prices only manifests itself in nominal 
GDP, in CEMAC such ﬂ  uctuations also indirectly 
affect real GDP on account of their strong link to 
public expenditure, with the government’s oil 
revenues on average accounting for more than 
22% of GDP (IMF, 2009).28
By contrast, WAEMU countries weathered 
the crisis comparatively well, helped by good 
harvests and improvements in their terms of 
trade, the latter triggered by declining energy 
prices coupled with a favourable performance of 
prices for agricultural products. Similarly, EAC 
fared better than other regions, possibly due to 
its largely prudent pre-crisis macroeconomic 
policies, which enabled it to enact timely 
and effective stimulus measures to cushion 
the downturn’s impact (see AfDB, 2010). 
Moreover, EAC’s level of trade integration, 
one of the deepest among Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
regional arrangements (see Table 3), may have 
sheltered its members from global economic 
developments to some extent. 
Membership of regional arrangements thus 
appears to have been a mixed blessing, with 
negative ramiﬁ   cations for SACU members 
contrasting with a more positive assessment in the 
case of EAC. However, membership of a regional 
arrangement is still clearly less important than 
a country’s association with the production of a 
speciﬁ  c raw material or group of commodities, as 
evidenced by the differing GDP developments in 
CEMAC and WAEMU countries.
West African Economic and Monetary Union (Benin, Burkina  25 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo).
East African Community (Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania,  26 
Uganda).
Under the SACU agreement, all customs duties and excise  27 
taxes collected by the members of the union are paid into a 
common revenue pool (CRP) administered by South Africa 
which is subsequently distributed among members. Allocation 
of the revenue is based on several rules, involving a customs 
component, an excise component and a development component 
(for more details see Kirk and Stern (2003) and IMF (2009d)).
This average masks considerable differences between countries,  28 
however, with government revenue from oil as a share of GDP 
ranging from 44.1% in Congo and 34.4% in Equatorial Guinea to 
zero in the Central African Republic.
Chart 11 Real GDP growth across sub-regions
(annual percentage changes)

























WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union.
CEMAC: Central African Economic and Monetary Union.
EAC: East African Community.
SACU: South African Customs Union.22
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Although the rapid global economic slowdown 
resulted in a fairly substantial deceleration of 
growth in many Sub-Saharan African countries, 
its effect has nevertheless been heterogeneous 
across the continent. While a dependency on 
commodity production, most notably on oil 
and minerals, seems to have been one of the 
key determinants of individual economies’ 
susceptibility to the crisis, other factors, such as 
the macroeconomic policy pursued before the 
crisis as well as domestic political circumstances, 
appear to have had a non-negligible impact as 
well. This broad pattern is also conﬁ  rmed by the 
analysis of the development of individual GDP 
components set out below.
4.2  THE EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL 
GDP COMPONENTS
If the contribution of individual GDP 
components to overall growth is taken into 
account, it seems that exports were the most 
prominent underlying force in the deceleration 
of growth (see Chart 12). By contrast, domestic 
demand, particularly from the public sector, 
appears to have remained rather resilient, 

































Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: The charts show the number of countries that experienced a fall in the growth rates of GDP and its components in 2008 and 2009 of 
more (1) or less (2) than one standard deviation below their respective 2000-2007 averages.
Table 3 Intra-Sub-Saharan African trade patterns
Global trade volume
of which: trade with 
Sub-Saharian Africa
of which: trade within 
the regional arrangement
(USD billions) (percent) (percent)
(2000) (2009) (2000) (2009) (2000) (2009)
CEMAC 13.1 40.1 6.7 6.3 23.7 24.8
WAEMU 13.4 39.7 26.2 24.2 40.6 41.4
EAC 9.2 31.3 22.4 20.2 58.4 52.0
SACU 1) 62.7 163.4 15.7 15.8 49.4 41.0
Sources: IMF, United Nations and own calculations.
1) Data for Lesotho are unavailable; 2009 data refer to 2007.23
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with substantial declines in private consumption, 
gross ﬁ  xed capital formation, and government 
consumption only witnessed in thirteen, ten and 
ﬁ  ve instances respectively by the end of 2009. 
This may also explain why imports reacted to the 
clouded economic outlook at a comparatively 
sluggish pace.
A country-by-country analysis shows that of 
the 32 countries for which exports of goods on 
average represented more than 10% of GDP 
during the period 2000-2007, 19 recorded a 
negative contribution of exports to growth in 
2009, particularly producers of oil and minerals, 
such as Angola, Botswana, and Sierra Leone, 
where the negative impact exceeded 20% 
(see Table 4). 
On the domestic side, investment depressed 
GDP in 13 countries in 2009, possibly as a result 
of a scaling-down or cancellation of investment 
projects against the background of the observed 
decline in the demand and prices for commodities. 
In turn, this may also explain why imports had a 
positive impact in several countries. In fact, nine 
of the thirteen countries which registered a 
negative contribution of investment to growth 
showed a corresponding positive contribution 
of imports.29 In some instances, this may reﬂ  ect 
a comparatively high level of imports needed 
to sustain these economies’ exports, as also 
evidenced by the relatively large share of 
machinery, vehicles and electronic equipment in 
the imports of countries such as Ghana and 
Madagascar. Likewise, the Seychelles registered 
a high level of oil imports destined for re-export 
(oil accounts for around one third of their total 
imports and half of their total exports) and of 
FDI-related imports.
On average over the period 2000-2007, private 
consumption was a positive factor for growth 
in all countries across Sub-Saharan Africa, 
with the notable exception of Tanzania. 
However, 19 economies recorded the opposite 
development in 2009, the worst outcomes 
being felt in Cameroon, Kenya, Mauritania, 
the Seychelles, and Zambia. In several cases, 
a drop in remittance ﬂ  ows may have weighed 
on private consumption, such as in Lesotho, 
where workers’ transfers, mainly from South 
Africa, constitute around 20% of GDP, or in 
Benin and the Comoros. On the positive side, 
private consumption accounted for more than 
10 percentage points of GDP growth in Angola, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, and Malawi.
Finally, government spending boosted economic 
activity in two thirds of the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa in 2009, though the 
magnitude of the public sector’s stimulus 
varied. In many instances, the leeway to 
support economic activity hinged on pre-crisis 
ﬁ   scal positions and the risk of debt distress. 
Even though benchmarks in this regard have 
improved in recent years, helped by improved 
implementation of macroeconomic policy, 
the favourable external environment, and debt 
relief obtained under the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) programmes, a number of 
countries, particularly importers of oil, were 
subject to relatively severe budget constraints 
on account of the measures they had to take 
to mitigate the impact of the food and fuel 
price shock of 2008. Individually, Lesotho 
recorded the highest contribution of government 
These countries were the Central African Republic, the Comoros,  29 
Djibouti, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Senegal, and the 
Seychelles.
Table 4 Contribution of exports to real GDP 
growth
(percentage points)
…in 2008  …in 2009 
Most negative contributions of exports to real GDP growth 
Gambia -6.3 Angola  -22.8
Togo -5.0 Sierra Leone -21.5
Sierra Leone -4.7 Botswana -20.2
Cote d’Ivoire -3.7 Guinea -7.5
Zambia -3.7 Togo -6.5
Most positive contributions of exports to real GDP growth
Equatorial Guinea  5.3 Uganda 4.7
Lesotho 5.9 Guinea-Bissau 6.4
Angola 10.2 Zambia 6.4
Uganda 14.5 Congo 8.2
Seychelles 24.5 Cote d’Ivoire 11.5
Sources: IMF and own compilation. 24
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expenditure to growth in 2009, while the 
ﬁ  scal stance in Chad, Malawi, Swaziland and 
Tanzania was also particularly expansionary, 
helping to cushion the impact of the crisis. 
By contrast, several countries (the Congo, Djibouti, 
Nigeria and Zambia) tightened and/or contained 
(Senegal) expenditure in order to consolidate 
their budgets, and were thus unable to rely 
on  ﬁ   scal policies to sustain their economies. 
 In addition, underspending on budgeted 
investment outlays reduced public sector 
backing to below intended levels in certain 
cases, such as in Uganda. 
To sum up, a number of conclusions may be 
drawn from the analysis in section 4:
First, the impact of the crisis on the growth    •
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa varied 
considerably from country to country, with 
the slowdown in real GDP mainly attributable 
to decelerating exports, whereas domestic 
demand components generally proved to 
be comparatively resilient. Government 
spending in particular has helped to alleviate 
the slowdown’s repercussions in a number 
of economies. 
Second, the crisis was initially primarily    •
felt by countries that are heavily reliant 
on the production of (a single) raw 
material(s), speciﬁ   cally where prices for 
those commodities fell sharply after the 
summer of 2008, and by textile exporters. 
Coupled with sometimes deteriorating 
export volumes, these developments had 
negative implications for domestic demand, 
often in connection with the sustainability 
of government budgets and the fact that 
investment plans are dependent on the 
production and proﬁ  table sale of a narrow 
range of goods. 
Third, in many instances internal factors,    •
such as political issues, macroeconomic 
policies pursued before the downturn or a 
budget dependency on commodity revenues, 
were at least as important in explaining GDP 
trends in 2008 and 2009 as the fallout from 
the crisis itself. 
Fourth, membership of regional    •
arrangements played an at best ambiguous 
role in sheltering economies from the 
ramiﬁ  cations of the slowdown, possibly on 
account of their frequently still limited trade 
and  ﬁ   nancial integration, their sometimes 
rather weak institutional set-up, and an 
occasional lack of political support. 
Lastly, whereas several Sub-Saharan    •
African countries indeed registered a sharp 
drop in their output in 2009, growth rates as 
compared to historical trends have overall 
remained comparatively high. In fact, 
a signiﬁ  cant set of economies has resisted 
the crisis relatively well, with some even 
recording an improved performance in 
2009.25
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5  REACTIONS TO THE CRISIS – 
HETEROGENEOUS CHALLENGES CALLING 
FOR HETEROGENEOUS RESPONSES
Although the monetary and ﬁ  scal  policy 
challenges faced by Sub-Saharan African 
economies as a consequence of the crisis and 
the measures implemented as a result  frequently 
differ from country to country, the following 
sections nevertheless ﬁ  rst attempt to provide an 
overview for the region as a whole and compare 
it with the emerging economies of the G20, 
before focusing on individual country studies 
with a view to deﬁ  ning common characteristics 
in how the authorities responded to the impact 
of the crisis.
5.1 OVERVIEW
Although the economies of a total of 42 Sub-
Saharan African countries are analysed in this 
study, the broad patterns of policies pursued 
to counter the negative repercussions of the 
crisis show some similarities, including when 
compared to the rather disparate group of the 
emerging members of the G20.30
In the wake of the substantial fall in commodity 
prices after the summer of 2008 and the 
intensiﬁ  cation  of  ﬁ   nancial market tensions in 
the autumn of 2008, exchange rates in the region 
depreciated considerably, more than reversing 
the appreciation trend witnessed until then. 
Notably, both the currencies of ﬂ  oating regimes 
and those of countries managing their exchange 
rates  31 fell signiﬁ  cantly (see Chart 13, Panel A). 
Nonetheless, the currencies of the latter group 
generally depreciated less, a stability that was 
ensured, in some cases, by signiﬁ  cant 
interventions in foreign exchange markets, 
resulting in sizeable losses of reserves 
(see Chart 13, Panel B). However, economies 
with  ﬂ   oating regimes observed a similar 
The emerging members of the G20 are Argentina, Brazil,  30 
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South 
Africa, South Korea, and Turkey. South Africa is excluded 
from the comparison in the subsequent analysis as it is part of 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
The classiﬁ   cation of countries into ﬂ   oating regimes and  31 
those targeting their exchange rate follows the IMF’s de facto 
classiﬁ   cation of exchange rate arrangements presented in 
Annex C. As regards the G20 members, China, Russia, and 
Saudi Arabia are identiﬁ   ed as targeting their exchange rates 
whereas all the other countries follow a ﬂ  oating regime.
Chart 13 Development of exchange rates and foreign exchange reserves
(index; January 2007 = 100)
Sub-Saharan Africa (exchange rate targeters)
Sub-Saharan Africa (floating exchange rates)
G20 emerging economies (exchange rate targeters)
G20 emerging economies (floating exchange rates)
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Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve levels were indexed to 100 in January 2007 for each country, before the indexes were 
arithmetically averaged across all countries in the respective group.26
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deterioration of reserve levels, in spite of at most 
limited ofﬁ  cial intervention.32
In order to further cushion the economic 
slowdown, more accommodative monetary 
policies were adopted across the region, 
particularly from the beginning of 2009 when 
inﬂ   ationary pressures emanating from the 
commodity price spike in the ﬁ  rst half of 2008 
started to subside (see Chart 14). Interestingly, 
the magnitude of easing as well as the extent 
of tightening observed beforehand was roughly 
comparable for Sub-Saharan Africa and G20 
emerging economies, irrespective of whether 
they follow a ﬂ   oating regime or pursue an 
exchange rate target. 
Overall, the monetary policy response of Sub-
Saharan African central banks to the supply and 
demand shocks experienced in rapid succession 
appears to have been generally adequate.33 While 
interest rate increases in response to rising raw 
material prices were appropriately moderate in 
the light of their temporary nature, the global 
recession was met with comparatively vigorous 
reductions in borrowing costs. This room 
for manoeuvre, which allowed the monetary 
authorities to play a growth-supportive role, is 
a reﬂ   ection of successful past disinﬂ  ationary 
policies pursued in a wide range of countries. 
The latter represent one of the most distinctive 
features distinguishing this crisis from previous 
crisis episodes.34 
Similarly, countercyclical ﬁ   scal policies were 
able to mollify the worst consequences of the 
crisis in many cases, thus helping to stabilise 
economic output.35 A largely prudent 
management of government revenue and 
expenditure in an increasing number of countries 
before the downturn allowed a departure from 
the often pro-cyclical ﬁ  scal stance witnessed in 
earlier periods.36 In fact, a majority of Sub-
Saharan African economies expanded their 
government expenditure in 2009 as compared to 
2008, thereby providing stimulus of an extent 
akin to that of emerging members of the G20 
(see Chart 15, Panel B). Remarkably, this 
support from the public sector was possible 
despite fairly substantial contractions of 
government revenues (see Chart 15, Panel A), 
demonstrating the non-negligible ﬁ  scal leeway 
some countries had accumulated over recent 
years. Indeed, at the onset of the crisis 
many economies had positive overall budget 
balances and reduced public debt burdens, 
which allowed them to increase discretionary 
spending and protect or expand core areas of 
government outlay. Measures included public 
infrastructure spending (Kenya, Namibia), 
increases in the wages of civil servants 
(Benin, Namibia, South Africa), and temporary 
In Sub-Saharan African countries targeting their exchange rates,  32 
foreign exchange reserves fell by almost 20 percent from peak 
to trough, with those of ﬂ  oating regimes declining to a similar 
extent. However, after adjustment for some of the multilateral 
assistance provided during this period (see also Annex D), 
reserves in economies managing their currencies decreased more 
strongly.
For an in-depth analysis of the implementation of monetary  33 
policy in Sub-Saharan Africa following the commodity price 
shock and the global recession, see IMF (2010k).
See also OECD and AfDB (2010). 34 
For a more thorough analysis of ﬁ  scal policies in Sub-Saharan  35 
Africa during the downturn, see IMF (2010j).
See for example Thornton (2008) and Lledo, Yackovlev and  36 
Gadenne (2009).
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support for prices for key commodities or 
subsidies for agricultural inputs (Burkina Faso, 
Tanzania). 
Nevertheless, depending on the pre-crisis ﬁ  scal 
situation, stimulus packages varied from 
increasing discretionary expenditure despite 
revenue shortfalls to small or partial adjustments 
to the shock and full-scale ﬁ  scal tightening.37
5.2 COUNTRY  STUDIES
Following this regional overview of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s policy response to the global 
crisis, the case studies below try to deﬁ  ne some 
commonalities among the responses of a number 
of Sub-Saharan African economies; frequently 
these depend on shared country characteristics.
In general the measures taken were primarily 
determined by the severity of the impact of the 
crisis and the monetary and ﬁ  scal framework in 
place, the latter often being dependent on the type 
of commodities produced. More speciﬁ  cally, 
three broad groups can be identiﬁ  ed,  namely 
countries that are deﬁ   ned by a concentration 
of their production structures and that faced a 
collapse in their export prices, countries whose 
room for manoeuvre was primarily determined 
by the way macroeconomic policy had been 
conducted in the years leading up to the crisis 
or which suffered from regional, intra-Sub-
Saharan African spillover effects, and lastly 
a non-negligible group of economies that 
weathered the crisis relatively well, be it because 
of country-speciﬁ  c factors, improving terms of 
trade, which is particularly observable in the 
case of many producers of agricultural goods, 
or resilient bilateral and multilateral support.
5.2.1 CONCENTRATION OF PRODUCTION 
STRUCTURES AND COLLAPSE 
IN EXPORT PRICES
Across Sub-Saharan Africa, producers of oil 
and minerals were hit exceptionally hard by the 
crisis, as these commodities often represent a 
high share of their GDP, exports and government 
revenues. Consequently, countries such as 
Angola, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea and to a 
lesser extent Nigeria experienced some of the 
most pronounced decelerations in GDP growth 
in 2009. In response, some of these countries 
See Krumm and Kularatne (2010). 37 
Chart 15 Government revenues and expenditures1)
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made use of the leeway they had to implement 
counter-cyclical monetary and ﬁ  scal measures, 
though others had to tighten their stance since 
the sharply deteriorating economic environment 
limited their policy options. 
In Angola, the collapse of oil revenues led to a 
deterioration in the balance of payments and the 
ﬁ  scal situation, triggering a fast depreciation of 
the kwanza, especially between the ﬁ  rst quarter 
of 2009 and the end of 2009 (see Table 5). 
The central bank was therefore forced to intervene 
to stabilise the exchange rate. At the same time, 
rising pressures obliged the government to draw 
on its foreign currency deposits to ﬁ  nance  its 
deﬁ  cit (IMF, 2009a). Additionally, a system of 
foreign exchange rationing was put in place 
between April and October 2009 and monetary 
policy was actively tightened via increases in the 
rediscount rate. Lastly, in November 2009, 
Angola concluded a USD 1.4 billion Stand-By 
Arrangement with the IMF to alleviate the 
adverse effects of the crisis.38
In Nigeria, lower oil revenues and capital 
outﬂ  ows led to a 28% depreciation of the naira 
against the US dollar between June 2008 and 
June 2009. Partly as a result of exchange rate 
interventions, reserves fell to USD 43 billion 
by July 2009, a 30% reduction in comparison 
to September 2008. Among other measures, 
the authorities introduced a retail Dutch 
auction system and required oil companies and 
government agencies to sell foreign exchange 
directly to the central bank rather than in the 
interbank market. Moreover, monetary policy 
was tightened by raising reserve requirements 
and redeﬁ  ning the policy rate as the mid-point 
between the central bank lending rate of 8% and 
a deposit rate of 4%.
On the ﬁ   scal side, some oil producers 
(Angola, Equatorial Guinea) had followed 
pro-cyclical policies before the downturn, 
resulting in a deterioration in their non-oil 
budget balances (see Table 5, second to last 
column). This limited the scope they had to 
accommodate the repercussions of the crisis. 
Consequently, Angola had to tighten its ﬁ  scal 
For a complete overview of all IMF programmes currently in  38 
place in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Annex D.
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Angola 1) oil -68.4 80.3 USD -0.2 -15.9 13.6 -23.6 -1.3 -21.9 -2.7 -16.2
(-13.3)** (17.4)**
Botswana 2) diamonds -42.3 81.8 ZAR 3.9 -10.5 -8.8 1.3 -10.0 -9.2 -3.9 -8.3
Equatorial 
Guinea 1) oil -68.4 80.3 EUR 0.0 0.0 1.8 -14.9 -6.2 -25.1 -1.9 -23.3
(-14.3)** (-41.2)**
Nigeria 3) oil -68.4 80.3 USD -11.1 -10.9 -10.4 -13.7 1.0 -12.6 4.8 -13.8
(-0.5)** (3.8)**
Zambia 4) copper -62.6 124.7 USD -34.1 4.1 -21.3 133.8 -5.0 4.2 -0.2 -1.5
Sources: IMF, Bloomberg and own calculations.
* Or latest data available.
** Non-oil ﬁ  scal balances.
1) Fixed peg.
2) Crawling peg.
3) Managed ﬂ  oat.
4) Independent ﬂ  oat.29
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stance considerably with the adoption of a 
supplementary budget in July 2009. Similarly, 
the scope for government support in Nigeria 
was hampered by ﬁ  nancing  constraints 
(IMF, 2009e). Equatorial Guinea, however, 
increased its 2009 expenditure as a share of 
non-oil GDP beyond its pre-crisis plans, despite 
its already high non-oil deﬁ  cit (IMF, 2009b). 
Likewise, Botswana’s reliance on diamonds, 
which accounted for about three-quarters of 
the country’s total exports and around half 
of its government revenues (Clausen, 2008), 
is likely to have substantially contributed to 
the sharp collapse of the country’s GDP in 
2009. In response, the government increased 
its expenditure by 41% between the ﬁ  scal 
years 2007/08 and 2008/09, even though 
corresponding revenues were improving by 
only 10%; this resulted in a deﬁ  cit of around 
4% of GDP for 2008/09. In addition, monetary 
policy was eased in the ﬁ  rst half of 2009 to 
foster economic activity; this involved several 
reductions in the bank rate between February 
and June (Bank of Botswana, 2009). 
These developments in Botswana, a country that 
is undeniably one of Africa’s success stories, 
demonstrate that good levels of governance 
and prudent policy cannot fully compensate for 
a high level of resource dependence, although 
they probably put Botswana in a better position 
to implement counter-cyclical policies. 
In contrast to the aforementioned cases, 
Zambia recorded an acceleration of growth in 
2009 as compared to 2008, even though it was 
particularly badly affected at the beginning of the 
crisis. The swift deterioration of copper prices 
after the summer of 2008 led to a substantial 
deterioration of Zambia’s trade balance, 
causing a 36% drop of the kwacha against the 
US dollar between June 2008 and June 2009. 
In order to moderate this depreciation, the 
central bank intervened in the foreign exchange 
market, resulting in a 27% fall in reserves, to 
USD 952 million, between August 2008 and 
March 2009. At the same time, the government 
responded to the revenue shortfall and delays 
in the release of donor funds by restructuring 
public debt, substituting domestic borrowing 
for concessional external ﬁ  nancing in order to 
create more leeway for credit extension to the 
private sector (IMF, 2010g). Nevertheless, 
a bumper harvest and higher economic activity 
in mining and construction, particularly the 
coming on-stream of a new copper mine (IMF, 
2010h), helped to bring about the observed 
increase in output growth in 2009.
5.2.2 REGIONAL SPILLOVERS AND RELEVANCE 
OF PRE-CRISIS POLICIES
Several countries either felt the consequences 
of the crisis because of their close regional ties 
to economies suffering from the downturn or 
were particularly vulnerable due to an already 
precarious economic environment before the 
crisis (see Table 6).
Because in ﬁ  nancial terms South Africa is the 
most globally integrated African economy, it 
was rapidly affected at the onset of the ﬁ  nancial 
market turmoil, even though its banking sector 
was hardly exposed to the assets at the core of the 
crisis. Sizeable outﬂ  ows of portfolio investment 
resulted in declining stock prices and, together 
with a substantial current account deﬁ  cit  and 
restrained inﬂ  ows of other capital, this led to 
a depreciation of the rand by the end of 2008. 
Following the intensiﬁ  cation of the crisis in late 
2008, the economy entered recession, triggered 
by a substantial decline in external demand and 
the slump in commodity prices, but also partly 
in reaction to a restrictive monetary policy up 
to this point. However, because of the balanced 
budget and public debt of less than 30% of 
GDP, the government was able to implement 
counter-cyclical policies to the tune of 4.5% 
of GDP in the ﬁ   scal year 2008/09, focusing 
on infrastructure spending and supporting 
demand in the short run. Additionally, monetary 
policy under the inﬂ  ation targeting regime was 
switched to an accommodating stance by easing 
key interest rates by 500 basis points between 
December 2008 and August 2009, thereby 
assisting an output recovery.30
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The downturn in the South African economy 
had a considerable impact on the country’s 
immediate SACU neighbours (Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland). The sharp 
drop in South Africa’s imports in the aftermath 
of the crisis affected SACU members because 
of their strong trade links with the customs 
union’s dominant economy 39 and the loss of 
a large share of a major income source for 
their governments, namely the SACU revenue 
pool, which is primarily fed by taxes on South 
African imports. Nonetheless, SACU 
authorities continued to raise expenditure, 
resulting in a sharp deterioration of their ﬁ  scal 
and external positions. In order to bring these 
back to long-term sustainability, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland primarily had to 
rely on ﬁ   scal consolidation because they 
are pegged to the rand in the Common 
Monetary Area.
Having been exposed to several sizeable 
shocks, Kenya suffered a downturn as early as 
2008. Against the background of an economy 
weakened by the country’s political crisis 
at the beginning of 2008, the subsequent 
considerable surge in fuel and fertiliser prices 
further depressed growth. The ﬁ  nancial  crisis 
then manifested itself in an outﬂ  ow of private 
capital and a slowdown of exports, giving rise 
to substantial declines in the exchange rate. 
As a result, ofﬁ  cial foreign exchange reserves 
fell by almost USD 800 million (20% of their 
stock) between mid-2008 and early 2009 
(IMF, 2010f). In order to support economic 
activity, monetary policy was eased by reducing 
the policy and cash reserve requirement rates by 
a total of 125 and 150 basis points respectively 
over the course of 2008 and 2009 (IMF, 2010f) 
and a counter-cyclical ﬁ   scal policy focused 
on a reprioritisation of expenditure. Kenya 
also received a USD 200 million loan from 
the IMF’s Exogenous Shocks Facility in June 
2009 to alleviate balance of payment pressures 
(see Annex D). 
Indeed, around 80% of Swaziland’s trade in 2007 was conducted  39 
with South Africa, with corresponding shares of more than 
50% and 40% in Namibia and Botswana respectively. Data for 
Lesotho are unavailable.
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Ghana  1) cocoa -19.9 45.4 USD -15.0 -14.4 n.a. n.a. -4.1 15.8 -5.3 4.8
gold -7.3 36.4
Kenya  1) coffee -25.2 -10.9 USD -16.8 2.5 -16.5 33.7 -2.6 3.0 -0.9 -1.0
tea -19.7 63.8
Lesotho  2) n.a. ZAR 0.0 0.0 n.a. n.a. -0.6 -6.7 -5.3 -5.0
Namibia  2) uranium -7.9 -18.2 ZAR 0.0 0.0 5.6 67.4 -5.7 -4.7 -1.9 -6.8
South Africa  3) coal -50.8 5.7 USD -16.0 26.1 -1.7 15.2 0.5 1.7 -3.1 -4.2
gold -7.3 36.4
platinum -59.2 67.3
Swaziland  2) sugar -6.2 120.0 ZAR 0.0 0.0 -2.8 21.0 3.0 -1.5 -6.0 -7.5
Sources: IMF, Bloomberg and own calculations.
* Or latest data available.
1) Managed ﬂ  oat.
2) Fixed peg.
3) Independent ﬂ  oat.31
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Whereas South Africa and Kenya were able 
to implement expansionary policies, Ghana 
faced a different situation. Although the cedi 
depreciated by around 30% against the US 
dollar between mid-2008 and mid-2009, in line 
with trends observed for other currencies in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, this was probably as much 
due to repercussions from the global economic 
contraction as to domestic macroeconomic 
imbalances which emerged prior to the crisis. 
In fact, in 2008 Ghana’s environment was 
characterised by major ﬁ  scal slippages due to 
election-related spending, resulting in a ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ  cit of 14.5% of GDP, high inﬂ  ation and a 
widening current account deﬁ  cit. Consequently, 
neither the government nor the central bank 
was able to follow expansionary policies, the 
latter being forced to tighten its monetary 
stance in the light of second round effects from 
the commodity price shock in the ﬁ  rst half of 
2008, which affected the prices of other goods 
and services, and the pass through of the cedi’s 
fall to domestic prices. However, this lack 
of room for manoeuvre notwithstanding, the 
country was signiﬁ  cantly helped in cushioning 
the impact of the crisis by its improving terms 
of trade, stemming from consistently high 
prices for gold and cocoa, its main export 
products, which account for one third and one 
quarter of its total exports respectively.
Box
THE ROLE OF MULTILATERAL SUPPORT IN COPING WITH THE CRISIS – THE EXAMPLE OF THE IMF
Alongside domestic policy responses, Sub-Saharan Africa has had considerable backing from 
the international community, through increased commitments and/or front-loaded disbursements 
under existing loan agreements, to help it to cope with the impact of the twin shocks of briskly 
rising energy and food prices until the summer of 2008, followed rapidly by the global economic 
crisis. For example, the IMF has placed a total of USD 5.8 billion at the disposal of Sub-Saharan 
Africa since May 2008, of which USD 0.3 billion was targeted at alleviating the ramiﬁ  cations of 
the rise in commodity prices and USD 2.7 billion was meant to be used in addressing challenges 
arising from the deteriorating economic climate. The remainder (USD 2.8 billion) was intended 
for the implementation of governments’ economic programmes, a more general form of 
support.1 
Additionally, in August 2009 the IMF allocated USD 280 billion of special drawing rights 
(SDRs) globally as a response to the crisis and this allowed a wide range of Sub-Saharan African 
countries to substantially improve their reserve positions. Indeed, these payments augmented 
the available foreign exchange reserves of Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi and Zambia by more than half 
(see Chart). For most of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, the ﬁ  gure ranged between 10% and 
20%, and the payments thus provided signiﬁ  cant assistance to these countries in dealing with 
potential balance of payments pressures.
Lastly, the IMF also enhanced its concessional ﬁ   nancing to low-income countries. As of 
September 2009, new commitments to Sub-Saharan Africa had reached USD 3 billion, compared 
with USD 1.1 billion in 2008 and USD 0.2 billion in 2007 (IMF, 2009).
1  See Annex D for a detailed overview of all IMF programmes currently in place in Sub-Saharan Africa.32
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5.2.3 IMPROVING TERMS OF TRADE 
AND COUNTRY-SPECIFIC FACTORS
In contrast to the countries discussed so far, 
upon which the crisis had a signiﬁ  cant impact, 
producers of agricultural commodities appear 
to have been somewhat more resilient to its 
repercussions, possibly because the prices of 
their food-related exports performed better than 
those of their energy and fuel-related imports. 
Moreover, a rather limited integration into the 
global economy seems to have played to the 
beneﬁ  t of some Sub-Saharan African economies 
in this particular period (see Table 7).
Indeed, as Cali and Kennan (2009) show, 
agricultural exporters apparently resisted the 
ramiﬁ  cations of the crisis better than mineral, 
fuel and textile exporters, since agricultural 
goods are generally income inelastic, and 
all the more so because they satisfy primary 
needs. Additionally, international prices of 
commodities such as cocoa, tobacco and cotton 
performed rather well in 2009 (see Table 7). 
Nevertheless, the global economic downturn was 
also felt in these countries and often their ability 
to address its consequences was hampered by 
ﬁ  scal measures that had been implemented to 
alleviate the impact on their populations of the 
2008 commodity price shock. For example, in 
WAEMU member states, policies that were 
taken in response to food and energy price 
increases in 2007-2008 weakened the ﬁ  scal 
position of governments in 2009. Measures 
which resulted in revenue losses included 
value-added tax decreases and exemptions on 
several key staples (Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal) 
and the suspension or abolition of customs 
duties on certain consumer products (Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal), as well 
as subsidies on energy products in Senegal and 
the temporary suspension of the automatic oil 
price mechanism in Burkina Faso. Thus, while 
the slowdown was generally less pronounced 
in low-income and fragile economies, it still 
entailed the risk of being particularly harmful 
in these countries, given the background of 
widespread poverty and the potential for policy 
reversals (AfDB, 2010). 
Despite being a relatively open economy with 
exports accounting for around 40% of GDP, 
Cote d’Ivoire proved to be largely resilient to 
the global crisis. With cocoa accounting for 
about one third of its exports, the country 
beneﬁ  ted from buoyant cocoa prices and from 
the effect of good rains on agriculture and 
Global general and special SDR allocation by the IMF in August 2009 – impact on 
Sub-Saharan Africa





















































Sources: IMF and own calculations.33
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agro-processing. Moreover, growth also 
reﬂ  ected strong activity in the mining, reﬁ  ning, 
and chemical industries. As it is a member of 
WAEMU, the country was also supported by 
the accommodative monetary policy stance of 
the Banque Centrale des États d’Afrique de 
l’Ouest (BCEAO) adopted in early 2009 to 
mitigate the regional impact of the crisis. 
Nevertheless, tight domestic liquidity conditions 
made the ﬁ   nancing of Cote d’Ivoire’s ﬁ  scal 
deﬁ   cit challenging, especially during the ﬁ  rst 
quarter of 2009, notwithstanding the fact that it 
was in line with the country’s IMF programme 
target. These constraints were eased, however, 
by World Bank and IMF disbursements in 
April 2009, followed by the Paris Club debt 
restructuring in May 2009. Finally, the 
authorities were assisted by supplementary 
BCEAO funding through the general allocation 
of SDRs by the IMF amounting to 1.6 percent of 
GDP. This was passed on to local authorities 
and used in part to substitute for more expensive 
forms of regional funding (IMF, 2009c).40
In Uganda, the slowdown in growth was 
relatively contained too. Total exports 
continued to perform strongly, buoyed by 
a large increase in non-traditional exports, 
notably agricultural products such as maize and 
beans, to neighbouring countries. It is possible 
that this development might indicate that the 
country was able to reap some beneﬁ  ts from 
the comparatively high levels of intra-regional 
integration in the EAC. Following portfolio 
investment outﬂ   ows, the shilling fell 25% 
against the US dollar between mid-2008 and 
mid-2009 (IMF, 2010d), but later regained 
some of its losses as capital outﬂ  ows tapered 
off and reversed and export earnings were 
better-than-expected. Even though the central 
bank intervened punctually in the foreign 
exchange market to smooth the exchange rate 
ﬂ  uctuations at the beginning of the crisis, it let the 
exchange rate largely reﬂ  ect market forces. At 
the same time, it stepped up its provision of short-
term liquidity to banks to mitigate the impact of 
the shortfall in external ﬁ  nancing, temporarily 
loosening the monetary stance while allowing 
some drawdown of international reserves. 
Following a decision by the WAEMU Council of Ministers in  40 
September 2009, it was agreed that the BCEAO would lend to 
WAEMU countries an amount in domestic currency equivalent 
to the general portion of their SDR allocation, which they could 
use in turn to clear domestic arrears.
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Cote d’Ivoire 1) cocoa -19.9 45.4 EUR 0.0 0.0 -9.9 45.0 1.1 4.0 0.2 -1.0
oil -68.4 80.3
Malawi  1) tobacco n.a. n.a. USD -0.1 0.0 17.5 22.3 -6.0 6.9 -0.7 -0.1
Mali  1) cotton -28.0 38.4 EUR 0.0 0.0 -10.3 49.7 -1.8 -0.1 0.0 0.5
gold -7.3 36.4
Togo  1) cocoa -19.9 45.4 EUR 0.0 0.0 3.4 20.9 -1.8 -1.2 1.0 -1.6
cotton -68.4 80.3
Uganda 2) coffee -25.2 -10.9 USD -16.9 1.3 -14.3 29.8 2.0 -0.9 -1.7 1.0
gold -7.3 36.4
tea -19.7 63.8
Sources: IMF, Bloomberg and own calculations.
* Or latest data available.
1) Fixed peg.
2) Managed ﬂ  oat.34
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On the ﬁ   scal side, a shortfall in government 
spending due to weaknesses in investment 
planning limited the impact of the ﬁ  scal 
stimulus initially introduced by the authorities 
(IMF, 2010e). 
In Mali, the impact of the global recession has 
been limited, notwithstanding the economy’s 
general vulnerability to external shocks. 
In particular, prices for gold, comprising 80% of 
Mali’s exports, remained at elevated levels and 
the fall in food and oil prices in the second half 
of 2008 helped to soften the impact of the crisis 
(IMF, 2010b). Additionally, Mali’s external 
accounts beneﬁ   ted from exceptional inﬂ  ows 
of capital, namely USD 400 million from 
the privatisation of the telecommunications 
parastatal SOTELMA and USD 100 million 
from the IMF’s allocation of SDRs.
Malawi also weathered the crisis better 
than expected due to good harvests and an 
improvement of its terms of trade in 2009. 
With tobacco accounting for 60% of total 
exports, high tobacco prices resulted in robust 
trade revenues. Malawi also proﬁ  ted from the 
IMF’s revised Exogenous Shocks Facility, 
which was intended to mitigate the impact 
of the commodity price shock in 2008, and in 
turn allowed the country to follow a rather 
loose ﬁ  scal policy in the run-up to presidential 
elections in May 2009. 
In Togo, growth remained low but did not 
decelerate signiﬁ   cantly, although the global 
recession delayed recovery from the ﬂ  ood 
damage and the food price shocks witnessed 
in 2008. Activity was supported by a counter-
cyclical ﬁ  scal policy, stable remittances ﬂ  ows 
and good harvests. 35
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6  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AFTER THE CRISIS – 
SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS AND LONG-TERM 
CHALLENGES
Against the background of a sustained recovery 
in global demand, particularly from emerging 
and developing economies, raw material prices 
continued to improve in the course of 2010, 
with most commodity groups either approaching 
or surpassing their peaks of 2008 by the end of 
the year (see Chart 16). Thus, food and metals 
were a mere two and ﬁ  ve percent below the 
levels reached in 2008, whereas beverages and 
agricultural raw materials were already being 
quoted at a respective 14% and 25% above their 
2008 highs. Only fuel remained close to 60% 
below the prices achieved in 2008. 
In parallel to these developments, the short-
term economic outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa 
improved considerably, resulting in a quicker 
than anticipated emergence of the continent 
from the repercussions of the crisis. The IMF 
therefore repeatedly adjusted its projections 
for the region upwards, from 2010 growth of 
4.0% forecast in the autumn of 2009, to 4.75% 
in the spring of 2010 and 5.0% in the autumn 
of 2010.
In addition, trade and capital ﬂ  ows displayed 
some normalisation, although the return to 
pre-crisis performance is not uniform across 
countries and indicators (see Chart 17). 
Merchandise exports as a share of GDP 
(see Chart 17, Panel A) were estimated by the 
IMF to reach or exceed their 2000-2007 averages 
in a large number of instances, except where the 
drop had been particularly pronounced, such 
as for the oil producers Angola, the Congo and 
Equatorial Guinea. Remarkably, net foreign 
direct investment in 2010 (see Chart 17, 
Panel B) was forecast broadly to remain above 
the 2000-2007 average, as it had in 2009. 
This suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa has 
sustained its attractiveness as a destination for 
foreign investment during and since the crisis. 
By contrast, net current transfers from ofﬁ  cial 
and – to a lesser extent – from private sources 
appear to have failed to rebound to a signiﬁ  cant 
extent so far, which may be a reﬂ  ection 
of comparatively lacklustre labour market 
developments and constrained government 
budgets in advanced economies which are 
typically the main source of these types 
of funds.
Despite this comparatively positive view of the 
economic outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the short term, it is also evident that the pace 
of expansion is highly dependent on external 
factors, such as future trends in world demand, 
especially for commodities, and sustained 
provision of aid and investment. A protracted 
period of relatively low growth in advanced 
economies or less expansionary policies in fast-
growing emerging markets would therefore 
pose a considerable downside risk for Sub-
Saharan Africa. In addition, a further rapid 
increase in raw material prices would be likely 
to create macroeconomic challenges similar to 
those observed during the food and energy price 
spikes in 2008, particularly for importers of 
these goods. 
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This raises the question of which policies 
countries in the region could pursue to reduce 
their substantial reliance on variables largely 
beyond their control, particularly the extent to 
which domestic demand can become a more 
important driver of growth in the future, taking 
into account the fact that improvements in this 
respect depend to a large degree on supply side 
factors. Some of the answers to this question also 
highlight some of the key lessons that can be 
drawn from the impact on Sub-Saharan Africa 
of the global economic crisis, and the food and 
energy crisis before it, as many of these events 
have served vividly to highlight the region’s 
traditional vulnerabilities, notwithstanding the 
signiﬁ   cant progress it has recorded in some 
areas during the last decade.
6.1 FISCAL  ISSUES
With a substantial share of export and 
government revenues dependent on the prices 
and production volumes of a single commodity 
in many countries, the spike in raw material 
prices in 2008 and their subsequent collapse 
has put the need for a prudent management 
of this source of ﬁ  scal income into the spotlight. 
It has also underlined the budgetary challenges 
for economies which suffer rather than beneﬁ  t 
from rises in the prices of these goods because 
they comprise a large share of their imports and – 
in processed forms – of their consumption baskets.
Commodity-related wealth raises issues of 
intergenerational equity and long-term ﬁ  scal 
Chart 17 Selected trade and capital flows in 2010












































































Sources: IMF and own calculations.
Note: Indicators are ranked from highest to lowest country observations along the x-axis, giving an insight into their distribution across 
Sub-Saharan Africa in each period.37
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sustainability, particularly with regard to 
non-renewable resources, as well as of 
macroeconomic management and budget 
planning in the short to medium term.41 Saving 
revenues derived from the exploitation of raw 
material deposits in the form of ﬁ  nancial assets, 
for example in a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), 
is generally regarded as an effective way to 
preserve national wealth and to distribute it 
equally among present and future generations. 
Moreover, it is also perceived to address the 
potential Dutch disease effects that are 
frequently observed in countries relying on 
commodity-related exports.42 However, the 
policy of advocating an approach based on a 
permanent income rule is sometimes seen as 
sub-optimal for emerging or developing 
countries (Brahmbhatt and Canuto, 2010), where 
devoting a larger proportion of resource 
revenues to high-return public projects, such as 
infrastructure, education or health, might be a 
more promising alternative (see also Collier and 
Venables, 2008). With the majority of the 
world’s least developed economies located in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the trade-off implied by 
this analysis is of paramount relevance, although 
it has to be emphasised that an economy’s 
capacity to absorb such investments has to be 
taken into consideration. 
In the shorter run, the unpredictability of 
commodity price ﬂ  uctuations poses formidable 
challenges for the conduct of ﬁ  scal  policy. 
Indeed, the transfer of cycles in raw material 
prices to government revenues may result 
in periods of elevated levels of spending, 
potentially on investments of doubtful value 
and with unsatisfactory returns, followed by 
phases of considerable ﬁ  scal  retrenchment, 
which might also hamper the implementation 
of viable projects. The overall result might then 
be a lower level of potential growth than could 
be achieved in a less volatile environment. As a 
remedy, the establishment of ﬁ  scal rules, ﬁ  scal 
responsibility legislation, or the use of budgetary 
raw material prices is widely encouraged in 
order to smooth the impact of commodity price 
cyclicality on government spending (York 
and Zhan, 2009). In Sub-Saharan Africa, such 
policies are indeed in place in some economies,43 
even though their implementation is not always 
particularly rigorous and could be strengthened.
In spite of high commodity prices generally 
being a boon for the vast majority of countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, asynchronous changes 
in the terms of trade across the continent 
are common, since many exporters of raw 
materials are at the same time importers of 
other commodities. Particularly during the price 
boom in 2008, many producers of agricultural 
goods experienced a substantial worsening 
of their terms of trade, when the rising value 
of their exports was eclipsed by the cost of 
their energy imports. Besides worsening their 
balance of payments position, this development 
also put signiﬁ   cant strain on government 
ﬁ   nances, insofar as several countries tried to 
offset potential negative repercussions for their 
consumers by implementing measures such as 
price controls, the elimination of import taxes, 
the lowering of value-added taxes, or the direct 
subsidisation of food and energy products. While 
these strategies in some instances appeared to 
be justiﬁ  ed as a short-term solution to protect 
the most vulnerable sections of the population, 
in some cases they threatened to undermine 
ﬁ  scal and debt sustainability and subsequently 
limited the policy options available to address 
the economic downturn which immediately 
followed. Consequently, although such measures 
may be necessary in speciﬁ  c  circumstances, 
rigorous assessment is of the essence to 
determine whether their presumed beneﬁ  ts are 
not outweighed by their associated costs. 
6.2  MONETARY AND FINANCIAL ISSUES
Despite the ﬁ  nancial sector being at the heart 
of the crisis in advanced economies, for Sub-
Saharan Africa developing the sector to a more 
advanced stage of intermediation may actually 
help to improve the capacity of policy-makers 
For an overview of ﬁ  scal challenges in oil-exporting countries,  41 
see Sturm et al. (2008).
See Das et al. (2009) for a detailed analysis of SWF policy and  42 
operational considerations.
For an overview, see Böwer et al. (2007). 43 38
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to react more ﬂ   exibly to domestic economic 
conditions and ultimately to achieve higher 
growth. Indeed, a more developed ﬁ  nancial 
system should enhance the ability of central 
banks to implement a more sophisticated 
monetary policy strategy through a stronger 
transmission mechanism. 
Furthermore, fostering the development of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s ﬁ  nancial systems might also 
allow governments to rely more on domestic 
sources to meet their funding requirements. 
This could considerably enhance their range of 
options in response to changes in the economic 
environment, such as in the case of the recent 
crisis, when external sources of ﬁ  nance became 
unavailable at the very moment when they were 
most in demand. However, these beneﬁ  cial 
aspects of increased levels of ﬁ  nancial 
intermediation notwithstanding, the ability of the 
public and private sector in Sub-Saharan Africa 
to cover their borrowing needs at home not only 
hinges on the sophistication of the ﬁ  nancial 
system, but in many cases also crucially depends 
on the availability and mobilisation of domestic 
savings. 
As well as underlining the importance of ﬁ  nancial 
sector development, the experiences of some 
emerging and developing countries before and 
after the crisis have rekindled an interest in the role 
of capital restrictions as a tool in addressing the 
potentially destabilising effects of substantial in- 
and outﬂ   ows of capital Indeed, limitations on 
cross-border transactions and payments may have 
helped to allay currency volatility, either via 
outright constraints on foreign purchases of certain 
ﬁ   nancial instruments or through price-based 
measures such as taxes on selected inﬂ  ows (Ltaifa, 
Kaendera and Dixit, 2009). Similarly, recent 
research  44 has explicitly singled out capital controls 
as a legitimate component of the policy response 
to surges in capital inﬂ  ows, even though it should 
be considered a temporary measure of last resort – 
in the light of its likely adverse side-effects – in 
cases of strong currency appreciation pressures or 
an inﬂ   ationary environment that impedes the 
ability of monetary policy to lower interest rates.45
6.3 STRUCTURAL  ISSUES
The World Bank’s estimate that the global 
economic downturn and the preceding food and 
energy price shocks will have left an additional 
90 million people in extreme poverty by the 
end of 2010 and resulted in 30,000 to 50,000 
additional infant deaths in Sub-Saharan Africa 
in 2009 (Friedman and Schady, 2009) serves as 
a stark reminder that, besides their monetary and 
ﬁ  scal impact, crises also impose extraordinary 
human costs in terms of lower income and 
consumption levels, higher unemployment, less 
investment in education, and a deterioration 
in health and nutrition. These developments 
also put into perspective Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
resilience during the crisis in comparison with 
other emerging economies and its relatively 
quick recovery when measured by standard 
macroeconomic indicators. 
Indeed, while addressing the factors presented 
in the previous two sections may also help to 
alleviate some of the human costs of the crisis, 
most of these issues do in addition call for 
accelerated structural reform and a re-
prioritisation of policies. First, a diversiﬁ  cation 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic base, away 
from an often exclusive reliance on commodity 
production and exports and towards output of a 
higher value-added appears to be key to making 
economic activity and ﬁ   scal and monetary 
policy more independent of the vagaries of 
global demand for raw materials and ﬂ  uctuations 
in their prices on international markets, and 
ultimately to guaranteeing a more stable pace of 
development. To achieve this goal, an important 
related issue which needs to be addressed is 
whether Sub-Saharan Africa should rely on the 
development of a competitive export sector for 
its long-term progress, considering the potential 
difﬁ   culties with this approach given the 
comparative advantages of other emerging 
markets and the non-negligible risk of an 
extended period of more subdued global 
demand, or whether in the short-term at least the 
See Ostry et al. (2010). 44 
For a comprehensive overview of the policy dilemmas emerging  45 
economies are facing in this context, see also BIS (2010).39
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continent should rather focus on an import-
substitution strategy in a regional context. 
However, irrespective of the answer to this 
question, a second prerequisite for Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s advancement is further improvement of 
the business environment through better 
enforcement of property rights and good 
governance. This would encourage private 
sector activity and foster investment. In fact, 
against the background of the progress achieved 
so far, investment in Sub-Saharan Africa might 
have especially beneﬁ  cial effects at the current 
point in time,46 since it would not only help to 
safeguard the advancements made to date, but 
might potentially lift the region to a higher level 
of development, and so help achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals. Third, as the 
energy and food price shocks in 2008 
demonstrated, there is an urgent need to address 
issues of food security and supply-side 
constraints in Sub-Saharan Africa. Investment 
in agriculture and in infrastructure, particularly 
in energy and transport, is therefore an 
indispensable precondition for attaining a 
permanently higher growth trajectory in the 
region. Finally, the crisis has brought to light 
some tentative signs that regional integration 
might actually reinforce the resilience of 
economies to external shocks, as in the case of 
Uganda, although the absence of well-designed 
rules may potentially harm member states which 
are party to regional arrangements, as 
demonstrated by the SACU countries. Indeed, 
SACU’s heads of state and of government 
meeting in July 2010 agreed to review the 
revenue-sharing arrangement, as the shortfall of 
income registered in the wake of the crisis 
highlighted several shortcomings of the current 
formula, most notably the high dependence on 
economic activity in South Africa.
See for example Collier and Warnholz (2009). 46 40
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7 CONCLUSIONS
Even though the consequences of the global 
downturn have been felt on a considerable 
scale in Sub-Saharan Africa, the scope and 
magnitude of its impact have varied widely 
across the region. Besides differences in 
economic structures from country to country, 
the circumstances under which individual 
countries entered the crisis also played a 
non-negligible role. 
Despite the wide-spread repercussions of the 
“Great Recession” in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
the analysis of the magnitude of the observed 
swings in macroeconomic variables reveals that, 
in contrast to advanced economies, comparable 
ﬂ  uctuations, although large, are not exceptional 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and are often in line with 
those witnessed in the recent past. Moreover, to a 
certain extent the present slowdown also reﬂ  ects 
domestic factors, such as pre-crisis political 
developments or macroeconomic policies, rather 
than contagion per se. In many instances, these 
have signiﬁ  cantly shaped the scope of possible 
responses, both positively and negatively.
As a result, many of the policy recommendations 
that might be made for Sub-Saharan Africa on the 
basis of the recent crisis do not differ radically 
from those made previously. The management 
of commodity resources in particular remains a 
challenge and a priority for countries relying on 
a single product. Moreover, efforts to diversify 
the economy, supported by the necessary reforms 
of the economic and business environment and 
further regional trade and ﬁ  nancial integration, 
appear to be of the essence if possible 
future external shocks are to be alleviated 
and macroeconomic stability preserved. 
Nevertheless, like the food and energy crisis, the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis also teaches some new lessons, 
such as the need to back growth prospects by 
re-deﬁ   ning sectoral priorities, for example 
by focusing on infrastructure and agricultural 
supply. Lastly, further challenges may also 
emerge, such as persisting ﬁ  nancing constraints 
for developing economies after the easing of 
the crisis, resulting in particular from budget 
consolidation efforts in many donor countries, 
or the exposure of domestic ﬁ  nancial  sectors 
to systemic shocks, which might require a 
re-focusing of policy priorities41
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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH 
EXPERIENCED A FALL IN MERCHANDISE EXPORTS
Countries are classiﬁ   ed into three groups 
according to the average share of merchandise 
exports in their GDP between 2000 and 2009. 
A fall in merchandise exports is deﬁ  ned as a 
drop in the export-to-GDP ratio to below its 
2000-2007 average in either 2008 or 2009. 
Where this decline is larger than one standard 
deviation the country is highlighted in bold.
Larger than 40% of GDP Between 25% and 40% of GDP Between 10% and 25% of GDP
(2008) (2009) (2008) (2009) (2008) (2009)
Angola Botswana Botswana Cameroon




Congo Congo Mauritius Mauritius Gambia Gambia









Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
Togo Togo
Sources: IMF and own calculations.42
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ANNEX B
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH 
EXPERIENCED A FALL IN CAPITAL FLOWS
Countries are classiﬁ   ed into three groups 
according to the average share of the respective 
(net) capital ﬂ  ow in their GDP between 2000 
and 2009. A fall in one of these variables is 
deﬁ  ned as a drop of this GDP ratio to below 
its 2000-2007 average in either 2008 or 2009. 
Where this decline is larger than one standard 
deviation the country is highlighted in bold.
Larger than 10% of GDP Between 5% and 10% of GDP Between 1% and 5% of GDP
(2008) (2009) (2008) (2009) (2008) (2009)
Net foreign direct investment
Equatorial Guinea Equatorial Guinea Cape Verde Angola Angola
Mauritania Mauritania Gambia Botswana

















Cape Verde Cape Verde
Gabon Guinea Ghana
Chad Seychelles Seychelles Malawi




Net current transfers (private)
Cape Verde Cape Verde Togo Togo Benin Benin
Ghana Ghana Guinea-Bissau Chad




Sierra Leone Sierra Leone
Net current transfers (ofﬁ  cial)




Rwanda Rwanda Ethiopia Ethiopia Chad Chad
Malawi Djibouti Djibouti
Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Gambia Gambia






Sources: IMF and own calculations.43
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DE FACTO MONETARY POLICY AND EXCHANGE RATE FRAMEWORKS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
(AS AT APRIL 2010) 
Monetary Policy Framework
Exchange rate anchor Monetary 
aggregate 
target




Exchange rate arrangement US dollar Euro Composite  Other
Currency board Djibouti






















arrangement Angola Guinea Mauritania
Malawi
Nigeria













Free ﬂ  oating Mauritius
Source: IMF (2010i).44
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ANNEX D
IMF PROGRAMMES IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (AS AT AUGUST 2010) 








Angola √ 1,400.0 Nov. 2009 Feb. 2012 To restore macroeconomic balances and rebuild 
international reserves
Gabon √ 117.3 May 2007 May 2010 To support the government’s economic 
programme
Seychelles √ 26.1 Nov. 2008 Dec. 2009 To support the government’s economic reform
Extended Fund Facilities (EFF)
Seychelles √ 31.1 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2012 To support the government’s economic programme
Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF)




√ 195.5 Mar. 2009 ESF-RAC 1) To rebuild international reserves and to adjust for 
deteriorating terms of trade
Ethiopia √ 50.0 Jan. 2009 ESF-RAC 1) To mitigate the impact of higher fuel and 
fertiliser prices on its balance of payments
√ 240.6 Aug. 2009 Oct. 2010 To cope with the effects of the global economic 
crisis on its balance of payments
Kenya √√ 209.0 June 2009 ESF-RAC 1) To rebuild international reserves
Malawi √ 77.0 Sep. 2008 Dec. 2009 To adjust for the terms of trade shock owing to 
increases in fuel and fertiliser prices
Mozambique √ 176.0 June 2009 June 2010 To cushion the country from the effects of the 
global economic downturn
Senegal √√ 186.0 Dec. 2008 June 2010 To cope with the repercussions of the food crisis 
and to help ﬁ  nance the balance-of-payments 
impact of the global economic crisis
Tanzania √ 336.0 May 2009 June 2010 To rebuild international reserves and provide 
balance of payments support
Extented Credit Facility (ECF)
Benin √ 9.1 Aug. 2005 June 2009 To support the government’s economic programme
√ 109.0 June 2010 June 2013 To support the government’s economic programme
Burkina Faso √ 9.2 Apr. 2007 Apr. 2010 To support the government’s economic 
programme
√ 67.7 June 2010 June 2013 To support the government’s economic 
programme to enhance growth prospects and 
proverty reduction efforts
Burundi √√ 75.6 July 2008 July 2011 To support the government’s economic 
programme, to consolidate macroeconomic 
stability and to cope with commodity price shocks
Central African 
Republic
√ 107.5 Dec. 2006 Dec. 2010 To support the government’s economic programme
Congo √ 12.5 Dec. 2008 Dec. 2011 To support the government’s economic programme
Cote d’Ivoire √ 565.7 Mar. 2009 Mar. 2012 To support the government’s economic programme




√ 551.5 Dec. 2009 Dec. 2012 To support the government’s economic programme
Gambia √√ 37.3 Feb. 2007 Feb. 2011 To support the government’s economic 
programme, extension for one year of the ECF 
arrangement in Feb. 2010
Ghana √ 602.6 July 2009 July 2012 To support the government’s economic 
programme and to address macroeconomic 
imbalances45
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Guinea √√ 110.1 Dec. 2007 Dec. 2010 To support the government’s economic 
programme. In 2008 augmentation in the 
arrangement to help to cope with rising food and 
fuel prices.
Guinea-Bissau √ 33.3 May 2010 May 2013 To support the government’s economic 
programme
Lesotho √ 61.4 June 2010 June 2013 To support authorities’ adjustment programme 
and help reduce balance of payments risks
Liberia √ 391.0 Mar. 2008 Mar. 2011 To support the government’s economic 
programme
Madagascar √√ 119.7 July 2006 July 2009 To support the government’s economic 
programme. Access augmented in 2008 to cope 
with rising food and oil prices.
Malawi √ 79.4 Feb. 2010 Feb. 2013 To support authorities’ economic programme
Mali √ 45.7 May 2008 May 2011 To cope with commodity price shocks
Mauritania √ 24.2 Dec. 2006 Nov. 2009 To support authorities’ economic programme
√√ 118.1 Mar. 2010 Mar. 2013 to support economic growth and ﬁ  scal position 
weakened by the global fuel and food crisis in 
2007-08 and subsequent ﬁ  nancial crisis in 2008-09
Niger √ 37.5 June 2008 June 2011 To support the government’s economic programme
Rwanda √ 12.0 June 2006 June 2009 To support the government’s economic programme
Sierra Leone √√ 75.8 May 2006 June 2010 To support the government’s economic 
programme. Augmentation access under the 
arrangement approved in 2009 to help support 
international reserves
√ 45.4 July 2010 June 2013 To support the government’s economic programme
Togo √√ 140.8 Apr. 2008 Apr. 2011 To support the government’s economic 
programme. Increase in ﬁ  nancial support in 
Sep. 2008 to cope withe global price shocks and 
ﬂ  ooding.
Zambia √√ 329.7 June 2008 June 2011 To support the government’s economic 
programme. Increase in ﬁ  nancial support in 
May 2009 to cope with the effects of the global 
economic crisis
Source: IMF.
Note: IMF programmes that are (1) pre-crisis, (2) post-crisis, but not crisis-related, (3) post-crisis, related to the 2008 commodity price 
shock, (4) post-crisis, related to the global economic crisis.
1) Exogenous Shocks Facility-Rapid Access Component.46
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